

Impact of Development Issues on Voting Behaviour: A Study of Sultanganj Assembly Constituency

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Abstract

Although development has become the primary language of electoral competition in India, constituency-level data on voting behavior concerning infrastructure, education, employment, welfare, and perceived government performance is still scarce. This study focuses on 384 respondents from Sultanganj Assembly Constituency with the supplied respondent-level master chart. Descriptive analysis, reliability, Spearman correlations, chi-square, exploratory OLS, and binary logistic regressions were used. Each respondent viewed development as important, with 50.3% responding that they agreed and 49.7% responding that they strongly agreed; development scored an average of 4.50 on a 5-point Likert Scale. Development showed a positive correlation with the exploratory voting-behavior score ($\rho = .162$, $p = .001$), and government performance and developmental initiatives index showed a stronger correlation ($\rho = .225$, $p < .001$). In the multivariate analysis, development remained a positive, yet small, predictor ($\beta = .101$, $p = .037$). Government-development evaluation was a stronger predictor ($\beta = .248$, $p < .001$). However, development and government-development evaluation could not explain the switching of alliances for the 2020-2025 period. While development is important in the performance evaluation of government and electoral reasoning, it does not provide an explanation for the observed switching of parties in this sample. This is important to note as we should not confuse the presence of the pro-development attitude in the electorate with the realignment of the electorate in the constrained situation of the response distribution.

Keywords: Voting Behaviour, Development Issues, Electoral Politics, Government Performance, Electoral Choice, Sultanganj, Bihar

1. Introduction

Voting behavior depends on the transformation of citizens' attitudes, values, and preferences into voting. Indian voters think beyond a single cleavage. Religion, class and social status, leadership, and welfare interact and are of different relevance in different polls and places. Several recent studies indicate the necessity to transcend a simplistic view of Indian voters as

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trapped in either identity or clientelism. These studies urge a more complicated view of Indian voters within multi-layered obligations and shifting political valuations (Auerbach et al., 2022).

It is within this changing context of electoral assessment that the value of development is particularly noticeable. Development projects like building roads, providing electricity, constructing schools, creating jobs, and delivering welfare impact citizens' capacity to make political evaluations. Economic-voting in India has documented that voters make assessments of political responsibility and blame across different tiers of the federal system of the country, when credit and blame are allocated differently across the tiers of the government (Ray & Varughese, 2021). Programmatic welfare and services can provide electoral support outside the typical clientelist networks when citizens relate services to governing performance (Barthwal & Ali, 2021). Advanced literature in the National Election Studies has also indicated that social and ideological influences of a more permanent nature interact with evaluations of the economy and poverty (Alam, 2024; Kailash, 2024).

Bihar is a good site to test this hypothesis. Elections in Bihar combine alliances, caste and religious mobilization, leadership, voting based on employment or welfare, and demands for public services that are sustained. Spatial analysis of the Bihar Assembly elections shows considerable variation in voting behavior across the state, necessitating examination of constituencies rather than assuming a uniform behavior across the state (Biswas, 2023). Therefore, we consider Sultanganj Assembly constituency for voting behavior study, where citizens can express both developmental and partisan issues. Official records of the Election Commission provide the institutional context of elections. The present study is based on the respondents' survey choices and self-reported values, and does not consider the survey responses as official election results (Election Commission of India, 2025).

This study asks, How much do developmental concerns influence voting in Sultanganj? We focus on developmental issues regarding inadequate infrastructure, education, employment, the state's duties towards development, welfare, and constituency schemes. We consider these with party affiliation, leadership, socio-economic status, caste, and religion, ideology, and demography. The emphasis is on evidence from respondents to differentiate general approval of developmental issues from actual (reported) alliance switching, voting behavior, and rational and statistically distinctive voting.

2. Literature Review

Studies on lower and middle-income country elections that focus on voter decision-making in developing nations can benefit from compared to other studies the inclusion of the presence of entrepreneurs, and the provision of public goods. Local context matters, Auerbach et al (2022), state that while aggregated vote outcomes seem to hide individual voters' considerations when assessing parties and candidates, it is important to note that economic and performance voting mechanisms allow voters to vote based on a country's level of economic development and a government's performance. Ray and Varughese (2021) in their case studies of Kerala and West Bengal, state that all levels of government are evaluated and voted upon based on the performance of the government. Alam (2024) performed studies on voter evaluations in the 2024 Indian Parliamentary elections and found considerable pocketbook voting based on the

performance of the government on employment, income, and economic policies. While numerous research studies attribute voting evaluations to the performance of the incumbent Government, the complexity of a Federal system where voters evaluate different levels of government is apparent.

Welfare politics adds another layer of complexity. Barthwal and Ali (2021) studied the 2020 Delhi Assembly election and noted that some instances demonstrate how programmatic welfare policies can break traditional patterns of patronage politics. Roy (2023) studied the expanding social protection in India within the context of transformations in the political and institutional landscapes, and illustrates how welfare policies shape the new rules and interactions between the state and citizens. Kailash (2024), using the National Election Study data, describes welfare beneficiaries as discerning voters. The authors in this group seem to suggest that in the context of welfare politics, voters' loyalty may be less pronounced and the assessment of the quality of implementation may be crucial.

Identity and leadership are important, but the literature emphasizes other areas as well. Sircar (2020) argues that the politics of vishwas is centered on a trust-based leader and can impact the strategy and modes of electoral mobilization. Sircar (2022) shows that in certain political and spatial contexts, religion can become an electoral ethnic identity. In the same vein, Trivedi and Singh (2022) show that ideological mobilization merges with social and cultural dynamics. Additionally, demographic heterogeneity is studied with respect to visible heterogeneity: Kailash (2023) studies the generation gap in political support, Vaid (2023) studies the class divide in political participation, and Deshpande (2024) has focused on the women voters.

Nakamizo (2021), classifies the 2020 Assembly Election in Bihar as having two distinctive characteristics: first, dynamics of the party system; and second, leadership dynamics. Parallel to this, Biswas (2023) studies the 2010 and subsequent Assembly Elections of Bihar and identifies the spatial dimension of disparity. Except for a few surveys, at the constituency level, on individuals' opinions on development, performance of the government and competing political parties, as well as the phenomenon of vote switching, the empirical studies are few. Thus, the arguments against development and the position that development is not the main reason for realignment of parties rely on the Sultanganj respondents. The distinction between principle of development and the individual's developmental behavior is important because if the range of individual answers is small, development in principle is appreciated by the respondents, it is not going to help in discrimination.

3. Research Objectives and Hypotheses

The research has five objectives. The first is to map voting and preferences in the Sultanganj Assembly Constituency. The second is to prioritize the importance of infrastructure, education, employment, welfare, and performance of the government. The third is to appraise development-related assessments and voting. The fourth is to analyze development-related switching of alliance between 2020 and 2025. The fifth is to appraise the relative importance of party attachment, leadership, socio-economic, identity, ideological, and demographic factors, to development.

Three pairs of hypotheses were assessed. With respect to the first pair, H01 states that developmental concerns do not impact voting behavior. In contrast, H1 states that modeling developmental concerns significantly impacts voting behavior. Regarding the second pair, H02 states that voting behavior is not impacted by government performance and developmental initiatives. H2 states that modeling significantly impacts voting behavior. Lastly, for the third pair, developmental assessments do not predict a significant change in voting behavior. H3 states that modeling significantly impacts voting behavior. Decisions are based on critical statistics at a 5 percent significance level. However, the p-values are also assessed along with the effect size and measurement reliability.

4. Research Methodology

Based on Sheet 1 of the Excel Master Chart, a quantitative, cross-sectional study was undertaken. The analytical sample consisted of 384 respondents from the Sultanganj Assembly Constituency. The workbook was designed to capture demographic data, self-reported data on participation, and parties/alliances preference for the 2015, 2020, and 2025 Bihar Assembly Polls, as well as five-point Likert-type answers on voting behavior, party attachment, and socio-economic and caste, religion, gender, leadership, political ideology, development, and government performance, and other electoral activities and phenomena. Since the dataset did not describe a sampling procedure with a probabilistic bias, no sampling framework and the population's representativeness are claimed.

We checked the quality of the data using spacing and duplication checks; we also looked at the serial numbers and categories; provided checking for inconsistencies in coding, validation against impossible values, and validation of Likert values. There were no substantial gaps, no cases of a respondent profile an exact duplicate and no out of range values found. The labels for income differed in terms of spacing and symbols with some categories having a rupee sign and some not. These labels were standardized for analytical coding and did not impact the answers to the survey. One question assessed to what extent the voting decisions were impacted by the levels of income. Five of the questions assessing the government's performance were averaged and used as an exploratory Government Performance and Developmental Initiatives Index. The Index's Cronbach's alpha was .601 suggesting moderate internal consistency.

As an exploratory application, we only report the mean of the respondents for the survey, since the five voting choice items yielded a reliability of $\alpha=.402$. Therefore, we examined the voting domain in detail. Other multi-item domains were summarized in a descriptive fashion and were not analyzed as latent constructs when reliability was low. A 2020-2025 switching variable was constructed using the switch to another alliance or party, where 0 remained the same choice and 1 indicated the other choice.

Data were described using frequencies, percentages, means, standard deviations, and Cronbach's alpha. For ordinal Likert items and restricted distributions, Spearman correlations were used. For selected ordinal associations, Chi-square tests and Cramer's V were used. An exploratory OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) model was constructed to predict voting behavior from development and government-development evaluation, along with political and demographic controls. Multicollinearity was checked using variation and tolerance. Binary

logistic regression was used to assess switching, while reporting odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals were used. All tests were two-tailed with a significance threshold of $p < .05$. All statistical computations were performed using sub-modules of Python (NumPy, SciPy, and statsmodels). After importing the workbook, no manipulation was made to the source records. Because the development item contained only Agree and Strongly Agree responses, restricted variance was treated as a measurement restriction. In this sample, regression coefficients were interpreted as relationships, not as estimates of causal effects.

5. Results and Data Analysis

The demographic breakdown of the respondents reflected a range of demographic groups, particularly rural demographic profiles. Respondents were split almost evenly along gender lines, with men representing 50.5% and women representing 49.5% of the respondents. The 41-50 age group respondents represented 29.2% of respondents, and the 50+ age group respondents represented 28.4% of respondents. 73.2% of respondents lived in rural areas. 35.9% of respondents fell into the EBC category, 25.8% were in the OBC category, 22.1% were in the General category, and 16.1% were in the SC category. 71.1% of respondents were Hindus, and 64.8% of households had a monthly income of less than Rupees 10,000. The sample was comprised of 89.8% regular voters.

Table 1. Socio-Demographic Profile of Respondents

Variable	Category	n	%
Gender	Male	194	50.5
	Female	190	49.5
Age	18–30 years	81	21.1
	31–40 years	82	21.4
	41–50 years	112	29.2
	Above 50 years	109	28.4
Marital status	Married	236	61.5
	Unmarried	137	35.7
	Widowed/Divorced	11	2.9
Education	Illiterate	143	37.2
	Primary/Middle School	88	22.9
	Secondary/Higher Secondary	78	20.3
	Graduate	50	13.0
	Postgraduate and above	25	6.5

Variable	Category	n	%
Occupation	Business/Self-employed	150	39.1
	Daily wage/Labour	85	22.1
	Service	53	13.8
	Homemaker	52	13.5
	Agriculture	43	11.2
	Student	1	0.3
Monthly household income	Below ₹10,000	249	64.8
	₹10,001–20,000	82	21.4
	₹20,001–40,000	16	4.2
	Above ₹40,000	37	9.6
Social category	EBC	138	35.9
	OBC	99	25.8
	General	85	22.1
	SC	62	16.1
Religion	Hindu	273	71.1
	Muslim	49	12.8
	Other	40	10.4
	Christian	22	5.7
Residence	Rural	281	73.2
	Urban	103	26.8
Voter status	Regular voter	345	89.8
	First-time voter	33	8.6
	Occasional voter	6	1.6




Figure 1. Distribution of selected socio-demographic characteristics.

According to one survey, participation numbers were higher in 2025 than in previous years, with 382 people reporting that they voted, an increase from the 2020 and 2015 numbers, which were 348 and 382, respectively. Support for alliances reportedly shifted over the three surveys. For 2025, 214 people reportedly voted for the NDA, while 170 supported the Mahagathbandhan. For 2020, the numbers were 194 and 188, respectively, while two respondents reportedly voted for Other. For 2015, 356 reportedly supported the NDA, 24 the Mahagathbandhan, and four voted for Other. While these numbers reflect recall in a survey, they are not actual constituency vote numbers.

Table 2. Electoral Participation and Self-Reported Party/Alliance Preferences

Electi on	Voted: Yes n (%)	Voted: No n (%)	NDA n (%)	Mahagathban dhan n (%)	Other n (%)
2015	348 (90.6)	36 (9.4)	356 (92.7)	24 (6.3)	4 (1.0)
2020	348 (90.6)	36 (9.4)	194 (50.5)	188 (49.0)	2 (0.5)
2025	382 (99.5)	2 (0.5)	214 (55.7)	170 (44.3)	0 (0.0)

Note. Party/alliance figures are respondents' self-reported choices or retrospective recollections; they are not official constituency election returns.




Figure 2. Self-reported party/alliance support across the 2015, 2020 and 2025 elections.

Development strongly correlated with answers in the survey (384 total responses surveyed). Construction, education, and work all influenced the participants' decisions in answering the survey. 193 (50.3%) agreed and 191 (49.7%) strongly agreed. The average was 4.497 (SD = .501). Infrastructure, Government, and development items were not as condensed. Their five-item index average was 3.881 (SD = .497) with $\alpha = .601$. The highest means for the items were employment (M = 3.917, SD = .797) and the developmental performance being more important than election promises (M = 3.857, SD = .793). The exploratory voting behavior mean of the five items was 4.051 (SD = .456) with lower reliability ($\alpha = .402$), thus caution needed for the results.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Reliability of Major Study Measures

Measure	Items	Mean	SD	Cronbach α
Voting behaviour	5	4.051	0.456	0.402
Party attachment	5	4.036	0.407	0.193
Socioeconomic factors	2	3.559	0.776	-0.001
Caste and religion	2	3.005	0.564	-0.004
Gender influences	2	4.536	0.368	0.106
Leadership	2	4.073	0.620	0.218
Government development	5	3.881	0.497	0.601
Broader electoral dynamics	5	4.054	0.385	0.136
Electoral variation	5	3.270	0.715	0.398

Measure	Items	Mean	SD	Cronbach α
Development issues	1	4.497	0.501	—
Political ideology	1	3.969	0.817	—

Note. Means for low-reliability multi-item domains are descriptive only. Cronbach's alpha is not applicable to single-item measures.

Table 4. Development and Government-Performance Evaluations

Item	Mean	SD	Neutral n (%)	Agree n (%)	Strongly Agree n (%)
Core development item	4.497	0.501	0 (0.0)	193 (50.3)	191 (49.7)
The performance of the State government influences my voting decision.	3.880	0.815	153 (39.8)	124 (32.3)	107 (27.9)
Government initiatives related to employment influence electoral choices.	3.917	0.797	139 (36.2)	138 (35.9)	107 (27.9)
Development programs implemented in the constituency affect voting preferences.	3.859	0.802	154 (40.1)	130 (33.9)	100 (26.0)
Welfare schemes introduced by the government influence voter attitudes.	3.891	0.794	144 (37.5)	138 (35.9)	102 (26.6)
The developmental performance of the government is more important than election promises	3.857	0.793	152 (39.6)	135 (35.2)	97 (25.3)

Note. The core development item asked whether infrastructure, education and employment influence the voting decision. No respondent selected Strongly Disagree, Disagree or Neutral for that item.




Figure 3. Voter agreement that development issues influence voting decisions.




Figure 4. Comparative mean scores of selected determinants of voting behaviour. Means are descriptive; several multi-item domains have low internal consistency.

Despite these findings, Spearman's analysis unveiled a very small, positive correlation of development index with exploratory voting-behavior ($\rho = .162, p = .001$). Development also positively correlated with the voting item related to a specific constituency and the issue ($\rho = .125, p = .014$). The government and development index correlates more with exploratory voting-behavior ($\rho = .225, p < .001$) and with some responses related to electoral variation ($\rho = .201, p < .001$). Development, however, did not correlate with the electoral variation index ($\rho = .029, p = .568$) and with the item that stated the government and development would influence the next vote ($\rho = .066, p = .195$).

Table 5. Spearman Correlations Involving Development-Related Measures

Predictor	Outcome	Spearman ρ	p
Development issues	Exploratory voting-behaviour mean	.162	.001
Development issues	Constituency-issue voting item	.125	.014
Development issues	Electoral-variation mean	.029	.568
Development issues	Future vote-change item	.066	.195
Government-development index	Exploratory voting-behaviour mean	.225	<.001
Government-development index	Electoral-variation mean	.201	<.001

Note. Two-tailed tests. The voting-behaviour mean is exploratory because its five items have low internal consistency ($\alpha = .402$).

The exploratory OLS model was significant, $F(12,371)=7.009$, $p<.001$ with an adjusted R^2 of .158, explaining 18.5% of the variance. Development was a positive predictor ($B=.092$, $\beta=.101$, $p=.037$) within the 95% CI (.006, .179) Development evaluation by government was positive and significant ($B=.228$, $\beta=.248$, $p<.001$) within the 95% CI (.137, .319). Evaluation of leadership and socioeconomic factors were significant ($B=.118$, $\beta=.160$, $p=.001$; and $B=.081$, $\beta=.138$, $p=.004$) respectively. Within the controls, predictor VIFs showed no evidence of multicollinearity (1.016-2.800), and therefore no serious concern.

Table 6A. Exploratory OLS Regression Predicting the Voting-Behaviour Summary

Predictor	B	SE	β	t	p	95% CI	VIF
Development	.092	.044	.101	2.09 2	.037	[.006, .179]	1.06
Government development	.228	.046	.248	4.92 0	<.001	[.137, .319]	1.16
Party attachment	.089	.053	.079	1.66 1	.098	[-.016, .194]	1.03
Socioeconomic	.081	.028	.138	2.88 2	.004	[.026, .137]	1.05
Caste/religion	-.020	.038	-.025	-.524	.601	[-.095, .055]	1.02
Leadership	.118	.037	.160	3.23 0	.001	[.046, .190]	1.12

Predictor	B	SE	β	t	p	95% CI	VIF
Political ideology	.008	.027	.015	.316	.752	[-.044, .061]	1.03
Age	.002	.020	.005	.114	.909	[-.037, .041]	1.04
Male	.030	.052	.033	.582	.561	[-.071, .131]	1.46
Education	-.026	.026	-.071	-1.005	.315	[-.076, .025]	2.28
Income	.031	.038	.064	.818	.414	[-.043, .105]	2.80
Rural	-.029	.049	-.029	-.604	.546	[-.125, .066]	1.02

The measure of the model's overall fit shows the model is an exploratory model because $\alpha = 0.402$. The outcome is exploratory.

The reported switching was unexpected. Between 2020 and 2025, 195 participants (50.8%) switched their alliance/party and 189 (49.2%) kept the same choice. The logistic model was not significant overall (likelihood-ratio $p=.653$; McFadden $R^2=.010$). The model showed no prediction of the development of the switching ($OR=.980$, 95% CI [.651, 1.474], $p=.921$), and no prediction of the evaluation of the government and the development ($OR=.787$, 95% CI [.519, 1.193], $p=.259$). A development-by-switching chi-square test was also null, chi-square(1)=.010, $p=.920$, Cramer's $V=.005$. Social category and gender showed no association of 2025 alliance preference. H_{01} therefore is rejected for the exploratory voting-behaviour outcome. However, H_{03} is not rejected for observed 2020-2025 switching.

Table 6B. Logistic Regression Predicting 2020–2025 Party/Alliance Switching

Predictor	Odds ratio	95% CI	p
Development	0.980	[.651, 1.474]	.921
Government development	0.787	[.519, 1.193]	.259
Age	1.098	[.913, 1.321]	.321
Male	0.989	[.611, 1.599]	.963
Education	1.187	[.933, 1.511]	.163
Income	0.835	[.586, 1.189]	.317
Rural	0.902	[.571, 1.426]	.659

Note. N = 384; 195 switchers and 189 non-switchers. Likelihood-ratio $p = 0.653$; McFadden pseudo- $R^2 = 0.010$; AIC = 543.184.

In the domains of comparison, these values demonstrated a need for caution. In this case, the alpha values for party affiliation and socio-economic status were .193 and approximately 0, respectively, while for caste-religion the value was also approximately 0. For leadership, it was .218, while for the other dimensions it was .136 for the broader electoral dynamics and .398 for electoral fluctuations. The values indicate that in this case, the relevant items of the questionnaire should not be considered to represent latent dimensions which are homogenous for this sample. Thus, the mean values of the items in this case may be considered as descriptive summaries rather than metrics that are valid. Of these, for leadership it was 4.073, for party attachment it was 4.036, for political ideology it was 3.969, for socio-economic status it was 3.559, and for caste-religion it was 3.005. Among the main determinants whose mean values were presented, development was the highest, with a mean of 4.497.

Carrying out the longer-term 2015-2025 comparison showed that 47.4% of the respondents had a noted change in their alliance or party, while 52.6% had a noted same choice. Because recall may influence reporting of past elections and because the goals of this study give preference to the 2020-2025 period, this comparison was kept to provide only a description of the context rather than to serve as the switching outcome for formal hypothesis testing.

6. Discussion

These results support a development-oriented voting interpretation, but it may be qualified in that development may be prioritized differently. For example, attitudes regarding the relationship between voting and the availability of infrastructure, education, and jobs were unified, while the empirical relationships were differentiated. Of the key development items, the relationship with issue-based voting was statistically significant, albeit weak. In contrast, the broader government-development index demonstrated a stronger relationship. It may well be that respondents are less likely to evaluate a general statement of development and more likely to evaluate a statement related to the performance of the government and its execution of programs and the creation and fulfillment of employment and welfare. This interpretation fits with the economic-voting studies that indicate Indian voters are capable of making assessments of the government's fulfillment of laws and policies related to the trading and market conditions of the economy (Ray & Varughese, 2021; Alam, 2024).

Evaluating the government-development coefficient as the largest of the key predictors, after controls, along with leadership and socioeconomic considerations, confers a important understanding of electoral competition. It demonstrates that voters in Sultanganj may not be considered development voters exclusively. Evaluating candidates in conjunction with fulfillment of economic needs may explain respondents' voting decisions. This demonstrates that the delivery of welfare does not diminish other forms of competition. This is demonstrated by the literature which indicates that voters may be highly evaluative, even if welfare is part of the competition, and may not be simply automatic clients (Kailash, 2024). Supporting this argument is Roy's (2023) documentation of extending social protection which demonstrates that the welfare delivery may be part of the routine assessment of the government.

In limiting statements, the switching analysis has its strengths and weaknesses. Approximately half of the respondents reported a switch in alliance in 2020 to 2025. Neither development nor

the government-development evaluation demonstrated the expected change. The null result is substantively meaningful. It may be the case that the development of the criteria that voters consider is not strong enough to make them cross the alliance divide. Between the evaluation of policies and the choice of last vote, many factors may intervene including the competition of parties, candidate selection, dynamics of campaigns, social identities, leadership, and context of the election. The spatially differentiated patterns of Bihar's elections cited by Biswas (2023) and the party-system dynamics described by Nakamizo (2021) illustrate the need for multiple-variable solutions.

Measures also have their limitations. In this case, the development item was essentially restricted to the option of Agree, thus creating a ceiling effect, which substantially restricted its capacity to differentiate respondents. The five component voting-behavior score has low reliability and several comparison domains had similarly low alpha. Thus, the regression should be viewed as an exploratory analysis of the survey responses, and not as confirmation of a stable voting behavior construct. The small but statistically significant relationship with the issue item specific to constituencies is indicative corroboration.

Not all controlled effects were found to be nonsignificant for caste-religion, ideology, gender, residence, and party attachment. This indicates that while none of the independent variables in this study were found to predict the outcome of interest in isolation, it cannot be concluded that these factors play no role in Sultanganj politics. There is ample research on religion, leadership trust, generation, class, and women's electoral participation which supports the conclusion that these factors retain importance in Indian elections (Sircar, 2020, 2022; Kailash, 2023; Vaid, 2023; Deshpande, 2024). Thus, development must be appreciated as one component of a layered approach to voter analysis and should not be considered as the entire reasoning behind the decision-making process.

7. Conclusion and Implications

This study finds that issues of development do matter in voting behaviour in the Sultanganj Assembly Constituency. However, the influence is more pronounced in reported voting rationales than in alliance switching. Infrastructure and education along with the provision of employment were considered in voting rationales and the development item showed a very small positive association with the exploratory measure of voting behaviour. However, evaluations of constituency development programmes, performance of the government and state, employment schemes, and welfare programmes and their delivery showed a considerable relationship with voting behaviour, and a performance-based interpretation would also be justified.

Leadership and socioeconomics also had significant relationships in the exploratory regression, demonstrating that people take numerous aspects into consideration when they vote. The effects of party attachment, caste-religion, ideology, demographic aspects, and residency in the sample were found to be non-significant. It is important to note here that the absence of relationships does not necessarily mean that these factors are not significant. These relationships were found to be non-significant in this sample and within this framework of measurement.

The results provide clear evidence that development had no impact on respondent's change of reported alliance, party, or both, for the periods 2020 to 2025. Thus, developments should not be considered as partisan realignment. For political actors, it should be understood that improvements in the delivery of jobs, infrastructures, welfare, and constituency programs will likely improve their scores on performance evaluations, but are not expected to result in a change in voting behavior.

The main challenges of this study were cross-sectional research design, the lack of probability sampling, low diversity in the measure of development, reporting of last elections, and limited reliability of most of survey scales. Vote choice research ought to combine multiple dimensions of development, panels, vote histories, and surveys in order to measure the actual development and how it can lead to changes in vote choice.

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